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PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND THE FRENCH 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Alistair Cole 
University of Keele 
The relevance of biography to the study of politics has often been 
called into question. Many political scientists have rejected 
biography outright as a pursuit more suited to psychologists, 
impressionistic journalists, and political historians . They have 
preferred the "scientific" study of political systems, within which 
there is little place for the individual leader. I would argue that an 
appreciation of the contribution of individual political leaders can 
be an essential component of any full understanding of a given 
polity, although this should not imply uncritical acceptance of a 
"great man" theory of political and historical development. Even 
if we accept, however, that individuals can leave their indelible 
imprint, it is unclear whether political biography, at least as 
practiced by certain of its exponents, is particularly well suited to 
measuring the contribution of individual leaders to a society's 
political development. 
The central justification of biography stricro sensu, "that 
knowledge of the subject explains or illuminates his or her 
achievements," is far from axiomatic. 1 Several potential pitfalls 
await the biographer. First, there is the danger of over-identifica-
tion with the subject, such that actions are judged disproponion-
ately in the light of what the individual concerned assens to 
explain his or her behavior. This is especially valid when a 
politician's memoirs are trusted as an objective statement of his or 
her beliefs or ideas or actions. Second, there is a tendency in 
cenain quarters for an over-concentration on incidental personal 
detail. Much of what biographies seek to illuminate, in particular 
the psychological predispositions of their subjects, might actually 
be irrelevant to an assessment of the contribution to politics made 
by an individual. Unwarranted extrapolations may be made from 
early childhood experiences with little firm evidence to support 
the biographer's conclusions. Third, there is always the risk that 
individuals will be treated in isolation, extracted from the political 
or historical circumstances within which they operate. 
These are, of course, oft-levelled criticisms which them-
selves caricature the biographical method. It is clear that a variety 
of different approaches can be subsumed under the title of politi-
cal biography. There is no commonly agreed conceptual frame-
86 
work. Attention has been concentrated upon a number of related 
lines of inquiry . 
PROBLEMS WITH PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY 
At its best psychobiography can give interesting insights into the 
personal~ty traits of political lea~e:s, the reaso~s unde1:lying the~r 
political rn~olvement, and the driving for~e ~~1ch motivates their 
pursuit of high ot:fice. _To ~he extent ~hat 1~d1v1du~ls matter, such 
analysis can be 11lumrnatrng, especially rn relation to whether 
many political leaders possess the requisite qualities and skills 
normally associated with leadership. 2 At its worst, however, such 
biography can be totally misleading, partly because it makes 
unwarranted extrapolations relating to an individual ' s political 
behavior from aspects of his or her private life, but also because 
it can misrepresent the latter. Formative experiences are subjec-
tively selected, and automatic associations are established . This 
is not to deny that personal beliefs and traits of character inherited 
from an individual's past upbringing might be of considerable 
importance in explaining subsequent behavior patterns and politi-
cal beliefs. Margaret Thatcher , the grocer's daughter who became 
UK Prime Minister, frequently referred to the fact. To refute this 
en bloc would be excessive. But an early note of caution is 
advisable. As Robert Skidelsky notes sardonically, the problem 
with such an approach is that "every achievement is actually 
something else displaced and it is this something else which ought 
to be the focus of biography." 3 Finally, there is the insuperable 
problem of measurement. How do we measure the importance of 
psychological factors, especially when so much of the evidence is 
so ambiguous, and provided by the interested politicians them-
selves? 
POLITICIANS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF AN AGE 
A somewhat different approach justifies political biography not 
primarily by focusing on an individual's psychological make-up, 
but by treating politicians as representatives of a particular age or 
generation. The effort undertaken is not so much one of socialized 
psychology, as one of assessing the attributes of political leader-
ship favored by a given historical situation. The individual 
political leader is of interest not primarily as a result of any 
dynamic personal qualities, but because he or she is able to 
articulate and aggregate the demands of at least one important 
element of society at a particular historical period. Such biogra -
phy then addresses itself not just to the individual politician, but 
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also to the broader political environment. A related line of 
analysis concentrates on individuals as representatives of a gen-
eration. Thus in France biographies of the various student leaders 
of May '68 have proliferated. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the unofficial 
leader of the events, is credited with being the perfect embodiment 
of the "May '68 generation." At its best such biography can 
indicate the manner in which different generations perceive 
political reality. 
THE GREAT MAN 
The "great man" approach supports the view that "historical 
events are caused by, or bear the imprint of, or would have been 
very different but for, the unique personalities of leading actors. 4 
Set against this model is one which asserts that the key to 
understanding historical and political change lies in analyzing a 
combination of social movements, socio-economic forces, insti-
tutional constraints, etc. In my opinion, the "truth" probably lies 
somewhere in between the two models. It is not necessary to 
accept a reductionist" great man" approach to political and histori-
cal development in order to appreciate the importance that politi-
cal leaders can sometimes assume. Individuals exploit opportu-
nities created by a particular set of circumstances, make choices 
from a number of different available options, exercise personal 
political skill. Some would argue that they occasionally exercise 
a charismatic authority, although it is not the purpose of this article 
to consider that area of study. But their achievements must be set 
in the context of the precise socio-economic, political, and cul-
tural circumstances within which they function as political agents. 
The study of political leadership clearly involves far more 
than biography, which nonetheless has a useful contribution to 
make. It demands consideration not merely of personality, but 
also of structural incentives and political methods for the realiza-
tion of personal ambitions. Personalities never function in isola-
tion. This article concentrates upon the career of one of France's 
undisputed "great men" of the post-war period, Fran<;ois Mitter-
rand. In particular, I shall concentrate on the manner in which he 
succeeded in manipulating the presidential institutions of the Fifth 
Republic to build his political career. I hope thereby to combine 
a study of leadership with an appreciation of a changing political 
environment, and to provide an assessment of how Mitterrand's 
ideas, style of leadership, and ways of acting within the political 
system have evolved since becoming president in 1981. 
France has had more than its fair share of "great men," so 
much so that, prior to the Fifth Republic, a fear of strong leaders 
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became an essential part of the French republican tradition. 5 At 
first sight it appeared as though by choosing Charles de Gaulle in 
May-June 1958 the French nation had reverted from a democratic-
republican model to a more authoritarian one, by bringing back 
the "great man" as they had done on several occasions in the past. 
In fact, such fears were greatly exaggerated. It is not proposed to 
consider the contribution made by General de Gaulle to the 
political developme~t of the F~fth Republic, although such ~n 
analysis would provide proof, if any were needed, that certain 
individuals leave their own unmistakable imprint upon their 
politic~ en_vir':mment. I m_ust point o~t, however, that the presi-
dential rnst1tut1ons of the Fifth Republic bequeathed by de Gaulle 
have institutionalized highly personal political leadership for the 
first time in post-revolutionary republican history. The direct 
election of the French president, introduced by constitutional 
referendum in October 1962, has greatly promoted the impor-
tance of personal political appeal, at the expense of more collec-
tive forms of expression such as political parties. One of the 
central themes of this article is that this has benefited nobody more 
than Mitterrand. 
Mitterrand was elected president in 1981, an event which 
surprised many commentators. I shall consider, firstly, changes 
in Mitterrand's attitude towards the institutions of the Fifth 
Republic, if there were any, once he had been elected president; 
secondly, the ideas which he sought to put into operation; and, 
finally, his individual governing style. 
MITTERRAND AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF ST A TE 
Despite his oft-repeated opposition to the monarchical character 
of the Fifth Republic's institutions, Mitterrand's 1981 presiden-
tial platform, the 110 Propositions, arguably contained no consti-
tutional proposals directly aimed at challenging the supremacy of 
the French president. As a candidate, Mitterrand promised to 
reduce the presidential mandate from seven to five years, and he 
paid vague respect to the idea of reinforcing the powers of the 
National Assembly, but these proposals were not implemented. 
Once elected president, Mitterrand substantially accepted the 
"executive presidency," which had evolved since de Gaulle and 
against which he had so violently railed since the late 1950s. 
Immediately upon his presidential victory of May 10, 1981, he 
dissolved the conservative-dominated National Assembly elected 
in 1978, and called upon the electorate to "give him the means to 
govern" by electing a Socialist majority. The dual mechanism of 
dissolution and of presidential involvement in elections for the 
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National Assembly was cleverly exploited by the new "executive 
president," as it had been by de Gaulle. 
The crushing majority for the Socialist Party that was 
returned in June 1981 owed its existence to Mitterrand. Once this 
majority had been elected, he insisted that the 110 Propositions 
were to act as "the charter for the government's activities," and 
that Socialist deputies must not overstep the limits of this pro-
gram. The pattern of presidential supremacy was thus reasserted 
by Mitterrand's early actions. 
Although Mitterrand introduced no successful reforms to 
limit the powers of the president during the first five years of his 
presidency, he claimed to have modified the constitutional prac-
tice of the Fifth Republic and to have restored control of govern-
ment. In September 1987 he explained: 
Working in collaboration with Pierre Mauroy 
and then Laurent Fabius, I attempted to fullfil 
my duties in such a way as the president 
presides, the government governs, and parlia-
ment legislates. I have protected the major 
functions performed by the president, in par-
ticular the concentration on great national is-
sues, which stem from the constitution and 
especially from article 5.6 
As ever it is difficult to accept Mitterrand's assessment at face 
value, as the essential elements of presidential authority remained 
intact until March 1986. Nonetheless certain commentators did 
discern a move away from the all-powerful presidency under 
Mitterrand, firstly during the early period of Mauroy's premier-
ship, and then much more apparently under Fabius, who replaced 
Mauroy as prime minister in July 1984. Mitterrand undoubtedly 
left Fabius a greater degree of maneuver than Mauroy. This was 
probably an attempt to prepare the ground rules for the virtual 
certainty of cohabitation after March 1986. But few doubted that 
when conflicts arose between prime minister and president, the 
latter retained his ascendency. We are left with the impression of 
Mitterrand as a politician who, in an ideal world, would reinvent 
the presidency, but who, in the highly presidentialized regime of 
the Fifth Republic, was content, initially at least, to accept the 
regime as he found it.7 
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-THE ENIGMA OF PRESIDENT MITfERRAND 
Discussion of the policies enacted by the political left in France 
lies well beyond the limited scope of this article. I shall limit my 
attention to how observers perceived Mitterrand to have changed 
over the seven-year period in office. In a highly provocative 
biography of Mitten:and's first seven_-year peri?d at the E~ysee, 
Catherine Ney has discerned seven different Mitterrand's rn her 
book Les sept Mitterrand. While Ney's historical allusions seem 
to me somewhat far-fetched, it is perhaps useful to retain four of 
her seven comparisons in order illustrate Mitterrand's essential 
political flexibility. 
FRAN~OIS-LEON BLUM (MAY 1981-JUNE 1982) 
Carried to power on a wave of left-wing enthusiasm in May 1981, 
which naturally led to comparisons with the Popular Front gov-
ernment of 1936, Mitterrand supported a radical program of social 
and economic change presided over by Maurey, his first prime 
minister. The government was led by the Socialists but included 
Communist ministers, the first time this had happened since 1947. 
During the "state of grace" (May 1981-June 1982), the reforms 
carried out by the left stemmed directly from Mitterrand's 110 
Propositions. It was a classic left-wing program: large swathes of 
French industry were nationalized, new powers were decentral-
ized to the regions and local government, labour relations were 
reformed, and important redistributive social and fiscal reforms 
were enacted. On an economic level, the left relied upon Keyne-
sian reflationary policies based on increased popular consump-
tion as the key to growth and to fighting unemployment, which 
was declared to be the government's number one priority. 
The comparison with Blum stems from the frenzied char-
acter of Socialist reforms during this first period. Mitterrand 
shared the belief-previously imposed on Blum in 1936-that 
after such a long absence from power, it would have been 
politically impossible for the left not to have gone ahead with an 
ambitious social and economic program of reforms. Mitterrand's 
primary objective was thus political, as well as strategic. His 
strategy was to tie the Communists into the governmental alliance 
in order to prevent them from making mischief outside of it, and 
to consolidate control over ex-Communist voters attracted to him 
in the 1981 election. 
But there is little reason to doubt Mitterrand's personal 
c_ommitment to the model of change outlined in the 110 Proposi-
tions. However we interpret his ideas, and however much we 
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recognize that strategic considerations have always held the upper 
hand over ideological ones, we are forced to recognize that once 
elected president in 1981, Mitterrand was extremely conscious of 
the fact that he symbolized the hopes of the peupfe de gauche. It 
is interesting in this respect that Mitterrand was initially reluctant 
to accept the need for a "pause" in the reform program, as 
demanded by his finance minister Jacques Delors, or the introduc-
tion of a tighter, anti-inflationary economic policy, as urged with 
increasing insistence by both Delors and Mauroy. 
"FRAN~OIS-CAMILLE CHA UTEMPS" (JUNE 1982-MARCH 
1983) 
The left's economic U-turn took place in two stages: in June 1982 
and in March 1983, despite Mitterrand's early reservations. The 
allusion to Chautemps, the Radical prime minister who replace d 
Blum in 1937, is meant to signify Mitterrand's acceptance that the 
dream of a break with capitalism was dead, but that it was 
important not to admit it, for fear of alienating the left-wing 
electorate. In June 1982, Mitterrand succumbed to the pressure 
exerted by Mauroy and Delors and agreed to a deflationary 
economic package which attempted to ease the pressure on public 
spending and inflation. At this stage, neither Mitterrand nor his 
prime minister Mauroy was willing to admit publicly that the left 
had changed course. The crucial point in Mitterrand's first 
septennat was reached in March 1983, when the president was 
called upon to arbitrate between two opposing economic policies 
in a move which set the course for the rest of his presidency. In 
effect, Mitterrand agreed with those who argued that the govern-
ment had to abandon its early attempt to reflate the French 
economy and to adopt a tight monetary policy in order to control 
inflation. 8 
Mitterrand's interminable ten-day hesitation before set-
tling on one of these rival options was indicative of his governing 
style. It gave the impression that the new economic course did not 
fully enjoy the president's confidence. 
"FRAN~OIS-RONALD REAGAN" (MARCH 1983-MARCH 
1986) 
According to Ney, having abandoned the left's messianic task of 
legislating a break with capitalism, Mitterrand-with character-
istic flexibility-gradually became the apostle of economic liber-
alism, imported from Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain . 
Ney points to Mitterrand's personal crusade for lower taxes in 
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1984 to his belief that artificial financial aid for lameduck 
indu;tries should cease, to the new presidential discourse endors-
ing profit and succes~, and to a belief i~ the superi_or efficiency ?f 
the private sector, rn order to provide the evidence for this 
• 9 
companson . 
Whatever the merits of ey's comparison with Reagan, 
there was clearly a qualitative change in governmental policy and 
presidential discourse in the latter part of th_e first_ ~ocialist 
administration. For as long as Mauroy was pnme mrnISter the 
public had the impression that Blum-style reformist socialism 
remained on the agenda , symbolized dramatically in 1983-4 by 
the church schools crisis. In July 1984 the old-style Socialist 
Maurey was replace by Fabius, at thirty-seven the youngest prime 
minister this century, a man carefully nurtured by Mitterrand 
since the early 1970s. Analysis of Fabius's program between 
1984 and 1986 lies outside the present study, but we should note 
that the ideology underpinning the Fabius administration was that 
of modernization, which for many was a euphemism for the left 
abandoning its left-oriented program of 1981-2. 
Mitterrand's public speeches from late 1983 onwards 
suggest that this transformation of old-style Socialism was con-
sciously willed. For instance it was Mitterrand who backed his 
then industry minister Fabius in February 1984 against Mauroy, 
his prime minister , in relation to the need for closures and job 
losses in the steel industry. Once Fabius had become prime 
minster, his full-scale modernization program arguably contrib -
uted to the slow death of old-style socialism in France. In a whole 
range of policy areas the left' s traditional policies were quietly 
called into question in the name of economic efficiency: nation-
alizations, economic planning, welfare policy, employment pol-
icy , attitude towards the private sector, industrial policy. During 
this period Mitterrand was frequently to be heard justifying the 
policy options of his ambitious young prime minister. The 
disagreements that did occur between Mitterrand and Fabius were 
over the latter's overarching ambition, caustically dampened by 
Mitterrand, rather than over the content of government policy. 
Taking the 1981-6 administration as a whole, we might 
argue that Mitterrand undoubtedly performed a valuable service 
for the French nation. Without the left's early radical program and 
the difficulties it encountered, it is unclear whether there would 
ever have been widespread recognition in France that the prob-
lems of economic management could not be explained solely in 
terms of the deficiencies of the capitalist system, and that the left, 
as_well as the right, had to be prepared to manage the economy. 
Mitterrand himself had declared back in 197 5 that " the economic 
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crisis is capitalism itself, it was caused by capitalism and not 
unleashed by the oil crisis of 1973."10 Ten years later his tune had 
changed . 
On a personal level the five -year period in office taught 
Mitterrand the absolute need to become well versed in economic 
affairs. Before 1981 he had deliberately cultivated a haughty, 
distrustful attitude towards economic issues. Mitterrand's reit-
eration of simplistic Marxist concepts to deal with complicated 
economic problems reflected in part his failure to understand their 
complexity. This willful economic ignorance cost him dearly in 
his televized debate with Valery Giscard d'Estaing before the 
second round of the 197 4 presidential elections. Such was his 
distrust of the economy that when elected president in 1981 he 
relegated the finance ministry-traditionally number two-to 
sixteenth position in the ministerial hierarchy, a foolhardy act 
quickly reversed. By 1986 Mitterrand could boast a solid grasp of 
the complexities of the economy; some would argue that this 
occurred only after a hard practical apprenticeship between 1981 
and 1986. 
"FRAN<;OIS-L 'ARBITRE " 
In the legislative elections of March 1986 the Socialists, the 
presidential party, were defeated at the hands of a right-wing 
coalition. This inaugurated a constitutionally unprecedented 
period of cohabitation between a Socialist president and a right-
wing parliamentary majority in the National Assembly. At one 
stroke the political basis for the executive presidency-the exis-
tence of a parliamentary majority to back the president-was 
removed. Mitterrand immediately named Jacques Chirac, leader 
of the victorious coalition, as prime minister, thereby respecting 
the eminently democratic logic that control of the executive must 
be entrusted to the winners of the latest election. From the outset, 
Mitterrand positioned himself as President de tous Les Fram;ais, 
the arbiter president above the political fray. His primary objec-
tive in stressing his role as president of all the French was to 
promote consensus across the left-right boundary in an attempt to 
efface the electorate 's memory of the left's unpopularity from 
1982 to 1986, and to promote a new image for himself as a wise, 
just and kindly but firm president , a figure above the humdrum of 
daily politics . From being the executive-president of 1981-6 
Mitterrand now declared himself to be an arbiter, the constitu-
tionaljustification for which lay in article 5 of the 1958 constitution. 
He did not challenge the government's right to govern according 
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to the constitution, but reserved his duty to fullfil his constitutional 
duties in particular that of arbitrage. 
' Far from being a disinterested, objective referee, Mitter-
rand initially envisaged his arbiter function as one of defending 
the rights of minorities and the underprivileged in society . In May 
1986 he declared : 
It is my duty to act in those essential areas 
which form part of the presidential domain, as 
defined by the constitution . In addition, in 
exercising my arbitral function, I must repre-
sent all those people who form part of a minor-
ity, and all those categories of people who are 
liable to suffer from injustice .11 
This suggested that the new, benevolent father-figure president 
had not forgotten his left-wing electors and would strive to protect 
their interests against a confrontational Chirac. But it was not in 
Mitterrand 's interests to transform cohabitation into a new left-
right battle. To a large extent, Mitterrand's attempt to portray a 
new ecumenical image as president of all the French could be 
reduced to political maneuvering-an attempt to attract center-
right voters alienated by Chirac into the forthcoming presidential 
election. But it also reflected a mature personal conclusion, 
reached after the left's years in power, that the left and right shared 
the same viewpoint on many of the great problems facing France, 
and that cohabitation had finally revealed this to be the case. This 
conclusion lay behind Mitterrand's decision to name his old rival 
Michel Rocard as prime minster in May 1988, and it explained his 
attempts to extend the boundaries of his presidential majority 
beyond the strict confines of the Socialist Party, once he had been 
re-elected in May 1988. 
"FRAN<;OIS-ROBERT SCHUMANN" (MAY 1988-MARCH 
1990) 
While it is clearly too early to draw a provisional balance sheet of 
the first two years of Mitterrand's second seven-year term, we can 
at least indicate certain key factors. In his 1988 campaign charter, 
the Lettre a taus !es Fran9ais, Mitterrand proclaimed solemnly: 
I believe and hope that whatever majorities 
there are in future, we will return neither to an 
"absolute" president, in effect an all-powerful 
chief, as with the beginning of the Fifth Re-
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public, nor to a president who has no power at 
all, a nonentity, as in the Fourth. 12 
A survey ofthefirsttwentymonths or so since the April-May 1988 
presidential elections suggests, superficially at least, that Mitter-
rand had respected his campaign promise to exercise a more 
limited conception of presidential power than had existed prior to 
cohabitation. He had concentrated largely on the traditional 
presidential domain of foreign policy, defense and European 
affairs, leaving Rocard's minority Socialist government in charge 
of domestic policy . Manifest presidential interventionism in 
areas "reserved" for the prime minister were less apparent under 
Rocard than either Mauroy or Fabius. But this conclusion must be 
qualified. Rocard had justified the major reforms passed during 
his premiership--wealth tax, minimum wage, priority for educa-
tion-by referring to Mitterrand's Lettre a taus les Franr;ais. 
Presidential supremacy remained intact, despite Mitterrand's 
weakening hold over the Socialists and a creeping sensation of 
l' apres-mitterrandisme haunting the corridors of power. 
Leaving mundane domestic policy issues to his govern-
ment, Mitterrand has concentrated upon exploiting his position as 
one of Europe's elder statesmen in order to hasten European 
integration and the construction of a federal Europe. France's 
presidency of the EC in the second half of 1989 was extremely 
active in this respect. Mitterrand also drew considerable prestige 
from the bicentenary celebrations of the French Revolution. For 
three days (July 13-16, 1989) Paris was transformed into the 
diplomatic capital of the world, when the bicentenary celebrations 
were combined with the G7 meeting of the world's leading 
nations. 
By comparison with the first two years of Mauroy's 
premiership (1981-3) French socialism would appearto have lost 
its heroic aura. It has become, instead, a socialism of the possible, 
as Mitterrand himself advocated in 1970. Left-wing critics of 
Rocard's consensual brand of social democracy have criticized 
the administration for lacking a "grand design," criticisms which 
are ultimately addressed to Mitterrand . What the left has gained 
in credibility, particularly in relation to its capacity for economic 
management, it has perhaps lost in inspiration. It is easier to 
inspire enthusiasm amongst grass roots supporters for visions of 
an alternative society than it is for inflation statistics. Such is the 
price, however, of political success, a success to which Mitterrand 
has contributed more than anybody else . 
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POLICY ADVISERS 
In the words of Schifres and Sarazin: 
Whatever the subject, however miniscule, 
Mitterrand never confined himself to a single 
source of information, even if it were fullest 
and most knowledgeable. On the contrary, he 
always compounded the briefings, the con-
tacts, the conversations, and formed his opin-
ion in that way. 13 
The advantage of this method of patient reflec-
tion was that Mitterrand was always particu-
larly well informed before talcing decisions, 
and therefore unlikely to act on impulse. The 
disadvantage was that the president often gave 
the impression of uncertainty and hesitation, 
fuelling suspicions of deep disagreements with 
his prime minister or other ministers even 
where none actually existed. On occasion, this 
governing style had unfortunate consequences, 
especially when Mitterrand was called upon to 
settle major economic questions. His apparent 
hesitations caused financial markets to panic. 
In his excellent biography Les annees Mitterrand, Serge 
July, editor of Liberation, recalls in considerable detail how, 
leading up to the crucial economic tum-around of March 1983, 
Mitterrand finally arrived at his decision to devalue the franc and 
remain within the EMS. Ten days passed before the president 
finally confirmed his decision, during which period even his 
closest advisers claimed to have been kept in the dark, so much so 
that contradictory statements were regularly issued to the media. 
In fact the coalitions advocating the rival options both believed at 
various stages that they had won the president over. For a full ten 
days, the sitting prime minister Mauroy was uncertain whether or 
not he was to remain at his post and, if so, which economic policy 
he would be required to pursue. A similar conclusion went for 
finance minister Delors, who on at least one occasion believed he 
was about to be named prime minister. The overall impression 
w~s one of confusion and uncertainty, undoubtedly because 
Mitterrand himself was torn between his emotional commitment 
to continuing the socialist experiment and the perilous state of the 
French economy. Indeed, the president had to make repeated 
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speeches throughout France to drive home the message that he 
fully supported his finance minister and the new austerity policy. 
To be able to make informed, well thought-out decisions 
Mitterrand consistently seeks conflicting policy advice, plural 
sources of information and rival policy advisers. This may take 
the form of setting two or more advisers to work on the same 
policy dossier in order to test their mettle, without, of course, 
informing them of their dual labors. Far from being merely a 
presidential game, this method is felt by Mitterrand to avoid 
excessive hierarchy amongst advisers, to provide him with the 
fullest advice possible and to remind everybody that no one can 
take his approval for granted. The spirit of competition amongst 
Mitterrand's policy advisers is reportedly intense. 
Very few of Mitterrand's advisers, not even Jacques 
Attali, the "special" adviser until April 1991, can genuinely claim 
to be continually in the president's confidence, or to predict the 
way that his mind is working. Mitterrand has a taste for secrecy. 
His advisers have on occasion been so firmly convinced that the 
president has made a finn decision that they have announced it as 
such to the media, only later to be reprimanded and to fall into 
temporary disgrace. Undoubtedly Mitterrand's secrecy has al-
ways been an important part of his personality, but it is reinforced 
by the isolation imposed by the nature of presidential decision-
making, an isolation characteristically felt by chief executives 
elsewhere. 
Mitterrand's extensive informal network goes well be-
yond that comprised by the mitterrandistes mentioned below. 
Those who, in all walks oflife, have served Minerrand will not be 
forgotten, although rarely taken into his confidence. Those who 
have had the misfortune to cross him, and who remain unrepent-
ant, for example, Pierre Mendes-France, will rarely be forgiven. 
Rocard had to spend some eight years of purgatory before finally 
being forgiven by Mitterrand for his presumption in challenging 
him for the Socialist nomination in 1981. These ties are based as 
much on personal affinity and mutual exchanges of services as 
they are on political loyalties. Witness, for example, Mitterrand's 
cultivation of student leaders such as Isabelle Thomas, rock stars 
such as Renaud, or sporting heroes . Partly because of his check-
ered career, members of Mitterrand's network by no means all 
belong to the left, nor are they limited to the world of politics. 
THE MITTERRANDISTES 
Mitterrand's biographers are unanimous in pointing to the impor-
tance of the highly complex ties binding him to his closest politica l 
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associates. In fact he has attracted inte~se political l?yalty froz:n 
several generations of followers, rallying progressively to his 
cause throughout his long car~er. A ~rrst generation of lo)'.al 
subordinates gradually crystallized dunng the Fourth Republic, 
when he led the Union Democratique des Socialistes de la 
Resistance. These included Georges Dayan, a friend since student 
days who died in 1979, Roland Dumas, foreign secretary since 
1983 Georges Beauchamps, who quit politics for business, and 
Loui; Mermaz, head of the Socialist parliamentary group for most 
of the Mitterand decade. The next generation of mitterrandistes, 
unsurprisingly, were younger._ Their loyalty t~ Mitterrand was 
forged in the early 1950s. This second group included Charles 
Hernu, whose Club des J acobins was one of the few genuine clubs 
in the early Convention des Institutions Republicaines (CIR), 
Pierre Joxe and Claude Estier. These historic mitterrandistes 
were suspicious not only of each other, but also of the sabras, the 
new generation of Mitterrand's proteges who made their careers 
within the Socialist Party after 1971. The sabras were so named 
after the first generation of native Israelis; they had come to the 
Socialist Party as their first conventional political engagement 
and had demonstrated an absolute loyalty to Mitterrand. The most 
prominent sabras still largely dominate the Socialist Party; these 
include Fabius, prime minister 1984-6 and president of the Na-
tional Assembly since June 1988; Lionel Jospin, party leader 
1981-6 and now education minister; and Attali, Mitterrand's 
personal adviser from the mid-1970s until April 1991, a man 
credited with an inside knowledge of the president that few can 
match. 
Mitterrand demanded absolute loyalty from his political 
aides, and usually obtained it. In fact, rivalries between mitterran-
distes were frequently intense, as each competed for the leader's 
favor. Indeed the leader saw such competition as healthy, because 
it prevented any one politician from emerging as the successor and 
thereby potentially threatening his continued suzerainty. When 
one of Mitterrand's presumed heirs assumed that he was strong 
enough to contradict the leader, he was firmly cut down to size, as 
Fabius discovered to his cost in 1985-6. The mitterrandistes were 
conscious of belonging to a privileged family, les intimes du 
Prince. Despite their fratricidal rivalries, especially between the 
<;IR clan and the sabras, the different generations of Mitterrand's 
lieutenants usually subjected themselves to his will. From around 
1974 onwards, with his control of the Socialist Party virtually 
complete, the leader-follower ties developed between Mitter-
ran~ and his lieutenants promoted patron-client relationships, 
which intensified once he had won the presidency. Politicians 
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who depended on Mitterrand for their political careers usually 
rewarded their sponsor with absolute loyalty. Apart from reflect-
ing his personal qualities, Mitterrand's political style probably 
developed from his original status as an outsider, a parliamentary 
broker well versed in the art of political flexibility, distrustful of 
institutional rigidities. 
Thus personalized ties were privileged as a mechanism for 
governing, first the party, and late the nation. For this reason, 
official governing structures probably bore scant relationship to 
the manner in which power was actually exercised. Mitterran-
dism became synonymous with a de-institutionalization of deci-
sion-making. This could be illustrated with regard to both the 
Socialist Party before 1981 and the actual rather than formal 
structure of authority in Mitterrand's governments after 1981. 
Mitterrand governed the Socialist Party after 1974 in a largely 
presidential manner, creating a "dual circuitoflegitimacy" within. 
the party leadership by appointing his own personal delegates to 
parallel the work of the official national secretariat, the party's 
main executive organ. 14 These delegates were responsible to 
Mitterrand alone, and they enabled him to keep himself informed 
of all the party's main policy areas and activities without having 
to rely on the official organization. After Mitterrand was elected 
president, his political advisers in the Ely see staff (le Secretariat 
General de l' Elysee) performed a similar function, this time in 
relation to government departments. UnderMauroy (1981-4) and 
still more under Fabius (1984-6), the governmental system was 
largely dominated by mitterrandistes, although Mauroy could not 
really be described as such. This greatly reduced the potential for 
conflict between the different institutions of the Socialist power 
structure-party leadership, parliamentary group, and executive. 
Each was controlled by the president's supponers, or, in the case 
of Mauroy until 1984, firmly subordinated to the president. 
Mitterrand's preference for evolving new types of person-
alized, unofficial arrangements for guiding the government and 
the Socialist Pany in the right direction was displayed in numer-
ous ways. In a typically French manner the dining-table per-
formed a quasi-official function as the arena where great affairs of 
state were discussed in a semi-formal fashion. At the early stages 
of his presidency, especially during the "state of grace" (1981-2), 
he spent a minimum of two breakfasts and one dinner a week 
meeting with representatives of the party leadership , the prime 
minister and selected ministers. The great novelty of these 
occasions was the petit dejeuner du courant A on Tuesday 
mornings, when the president met with the leaders of his faction 
within the Socialist Party, led by Jospin, in the absence of the 
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prime minister Mauroy. Such meetings between the president and 
his party leaders to discuss _policy . ~ere unprecedented in the 
history of the Fifth Republic. Critics argued that they were 
symbolic of the chaos wroug?twithin t~eexecut~ve by ~~terrand's 
governina style. Maurey s authonty as pnme mm1ster was 
frequently undermined by individ~al minist~rs app_e~ling directly 
to the president to back them agarn~t. the pnme m_rn1ster. . 
If Mitterrand has made political loyalty rnto a cardinal 
virtue, this has been transformed only rarely into personal friend-
ship. Those to whom he permits himself to use the familiar tu form 
of address are limited to his immediate family, and a handful of 
exceptionally close friends. Despite the rivalries prevailing 
amongst Mitterrand's differe_nt l~eu_tenants, the sense of all be-
longing to an extended family 1s rmportant. Every year, the 
extended mitterrandiste family joins together on a number of 
symbolic occasions, such as the Elysee garden party on July 14, 
or the trek to Solutre in Burgundy just before ' the September 
rentree des classes. Media attention focuses closely upon who is 
invited to such gatherings, and even more so on those out of favor. 
Mitterrand's political career has been characterized above 
all by a rare capacity to adapt to changing political circumstances. 
He was one of the first politicians to respond with shrewd 
acceptance of the new "rules of the game" implied by the presi-
dential election, despite his initial condemnation of the new 
regime as a coup d'etat permanent. His status as presidential 
leader of the left for most of the period after the first direct election 
of the president in 1965 was of immense political benefit to him, 
eventually carrying him to the presidency in 1981. There was 
nothing predestined about this. 
Mitterrand was initially an unlikely champion of the left. 
He displayed considerable political skill in his dealings with other 
politicians, opponents and allies alike, as well as in his perception 
of the requirements of political strategy. Of course, he had his 
share of chance and misfortune, like any other successful politi-
cian. Along with his flexibility, his personal resilience, and his 
ability to recover from seemingly hopeless political situations, as 
in 1958, 1968 or 1986, should be noted. 
While there can be little doubt concerning the importance 
of the presidential institutions of the Fifth Republic for Mitterrand's 
caree~, it _is probably impossible as yet to measure how great his 
contnbut1on to the contemporary political environment in France 
has ~een. ~ny assessment involves a large measure of subjective 
cons1derat1on. Had Mitterrand not won the presidency in 1981, 
the left would have been deprived of the possibility of attempting 
to translate its radical dreams, nurtured by long years of opposi-
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tion, into reality. Without the left' s early radical program and the 
difficulties it encountered, it is unclear whether the degree of 
economic consensus which currently exists in France would ever 
have materialized. In so far as his first seven-year term as 
president symbolized the transformation of old-style socialism, 
Mitterrand must take the credit or blame, symbolically at least, for 
reconciling the left with the economy, and the Socialist Party with 
its social-democratic fate. This is so, although he was clearly 
reacting to events, rather than foreseeing them clearly. On the 
positive side, Mitterrand is a living testimony to the fact that the 
reformist left in France no longer feels a sense of exclusion from 
the political system of the Fifth Republic. By extension he has 
helped to secure a wider, bi-partisan acceptance of the political 
regime. Of course, none of these factors should be ascribed to 
Mitterrand alone. The economic and political aggiornamento of 
his first term was forced upon him by complex forces outside of 
his control. At best, he reacted with considerable flexibility to 
events he only partially commanded. But some would argue that 
the effectiveness of political leadership depends as much on a 
leader's adaptability as it does on any refusal in principle to 
change course. Our final impression of Mitterrand must be that of 
a formidable politician able to command unrivalled loyalty, the 
most formidable certainly since de Gaulle, but also that of a man 
who remains an enigma. In the words of July again, "even for his 
closest friends, the man is elusive." 15 
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